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1Abstract: we examine the effects of collateral provision as a potential channel between funding
liquidity tensions and the scarcity of market liquidity. This channel consists in transferring the credit
risk associated with reﬁnancing operations between ﬁnancial institutions to market participants that
bear new liquidity risk on the market associated with collateral. In particular, we address the issue of
the liquidity of the French government debt securities market, since these assets are used as collateral
both in the open market operations of the ECB and on the interbank market. We use a time-varying
transition probability (TVTP) VAR model considering both the monetary policy cycle and the cycle of
French treasury auctions. We highlight the existence of a speciﬁc regime in which monetary policy
neutrality is not veriﬁed on the market for French bonds. Moreover, the existence of conventional and
unconventional regimes leads to asymmetries in monetary policy implementation.
Key Words: Monetary policy, collateral, liquidity, volatility, French bond market.
Subject Classiﬁcation: G10, C22, C53.
Résumé : nous considérons les effets des provisions de collatéral comme un canal de transmission
entre la liquidité du reﬁnancement et l’assèchement de la liquidité de marché. Ce canal consiste en un
transfert du risque de crédit associé aux opérations de reﬁnancement des institutions ﬁnancières vers les
participants de marché qui supportent alors un nouveau risque de liquidité sur le marché associé au col-
latéral. En particulier, nous prenons le cas du marché des bons d’États français, étant donné l’utilisation
de ces actifs à la fois dans les opérations de reﬁnancement de la BCE et sur le marché interbancaire.
Nous utilisons un modèle VAR avec changement de régimes à probabilités de transition variables dans
le temps (TVTP-VAR) en contrôlant pour le cycle de politique monétaire et le cycle d’adjudication de
titres d’État français. Nous mettons en évidence l’existence d’un régime particulier pour lequel la neu-
tralité de la politique monétaire n’est pas vériﬁée sur les marchés des titres d’États français. De plus,
l’existence des régimes conventionnel et non conventionnel implique une implémentation asymétrique
de la politique monétaire.
Mots-clés: Politique monétaire, collatéral, liquidité, volatilité, Marché français des titres d’États.
Classiﬁcation: G10, C22, C53.
21. INTRODUCTION
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the impact of funding tensions on the inter-
bank market and monetary policy on a market associated with the collateral mobilized for
these operations: the French government debt securities market. This asset class is used both
during the open market operations (OMOs) managed by the central bank and on the secured
interbank market. As in any credit operation, open market operations and the interbank fund-
ing process are subject to credit risk (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), so that collateral is provided to
ensure the lender against any default by the borrower.
Regarding the reﬁnancing process operated by the central bank, the collateral require-
ments are essential for several reasons. Firstly, they concern marketable assets usually marked
to market on a daily basis. Indeed, the value of collateral is provided by the market so that
it is not constant throughout the duration of the loan. This does not expose the central bank
to credit risk, but to market risk. One way to circumvent this problem is the mechanism im-
plemented known as variation margins: if the value of the collateral varies, banks should
compensate for potential losses.
If market risk is taken into account, market liquidity becomes a key factor in determining
the value of collateral (Manning and Willison, 2006). Market liquidity is the ability to obtain a
fair price for an asset given that enough agents are participating in market. It has been widely
studied in the microstructure literature through spread measures, resilience, transaction costs,
etc. (Amihud and Mendelson, 1992; Huang and Stoll, 1997; Biais et al., 2005).
The question is whether tensions in the reﬁnancing process of the banking system may
turn credit risk into market liquidity risk via the extensive use of some types of collateral. For
example, Green (2005) shows that the assets eligible as collateral provide lower rates of return
than those not eligible by incurring an opportunity cost to owners. A potential risk to under-
score in this paper is that the excessive use of an asset as collateral that is marked to market
may ultimately create market inefﬁciencies. Through this mechanism, the increased credit
3risk in the funding process is no longer borne by the lender but by all market participants.
This transfer of risk may come from various sources.
First, the increased risk associated with interbank reﬁnancing may create a concentration
on some types of eligible collateral, i.e. those of highest quality such as government bonds.
Second, this higher counterparty risk increases the haircuts on the value of the collateral so
that larger amounts of collateral become necessary for the loan. Third, increased reﬁnancing
viathecentralbankraisestheamountofcollateralrequired. Fourth, thestepping-upofspecial
reﬁnancing operations, illustrating the tensions in the banking sector, results in more frequent
aggressive trading of collateral. Finally, the longer maturities of reﬁnancing operations also
require larger amounts of collateral to provide to the lender. For example, in 2006, deposit
collateral amounted to EUR 959 billion, while in September 2008 it stood at EUR 1,585 billion.
It should be noted that this channel is identiﬁed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009),
who show that haircut spirals in the funding process may destabilize the entire ﬁnancial sys-
tem and impact the value of the collateral itself. It was a concern of the ECB monetary policy
framework right from the start not to impact other ﬁnancial markets, such as government
bond markets, too much and to remain neutral. For example, the choice to adopt a broad
approach for types of collateral instead of a narrow one, as in the case of US Federal Reserve,
is understandable, as mentioned by Cheun et al. (2009), since in the US the ratio of temporary
operations to the size of the domestic government bond market before the crisis was 1/200,
compared to 1/10 for the Eurosystem, which would lead to substantial constraints on collat-
eral and have an impact on government bond markets. In the case of the Bank of England, this
ratio is 1/9, which constituted a strong incentive to expand eligibility to include all euro area
government bonds (with the presence of a rating threshold). However, given the particular
circumstances prevailing since the onset of the crisis in 2008, and even if the collateral ap-
proach of the ECB was already broad, we wonder if market neutrality can always be achieved
in the monetary policy stance.
Furthermore, Diaz et al. (2006), among others, examine the impact of EMU on the liq-
4uidity of Treasury bonds and market volatility. They conclude that EMU led to sharp falls
in volatility and improved efﬁciency in the Spanish Treasury bond market. Fleming (2003)
and Goldreich et al. (2005) focus on the liquidity of US Treasuries and its impact on rates.
Chakravarty and Saskar (1999) also compare the different bond segments in terms of bid-ask
spreads. Moreover, Dunne et al. (2002) and Dunne et al. (2007) show that, contrary to the
prevailing market belief, the 10-year segment of the French bond market is a benchmark asset
for the European bond market as a whole. In addition, this market has clearly developed over
the last ten years to become an important market with international investors. In our analysis,
we focus on the French debt market, which is used both by banks as collateral in open mar-
ket operations and on the interbank market. Our approach is different from the papers cited
above since we focus particularly on bonds as collateral, liquidity at the transaction level and
the associated market risk using high-frequency data.
To analyze the role of collateral rules, we use two different maturities for French govern-
ment securities: the rate on three-month Treasuries and the rate of 10-year notes. The analysis
is based on high-frequency data identifying all quotations for on-the-run three-month and
10-year securities between 2003 and 2009. We analyze the impact of collateral provision on
the market via the associated liquidity (bid-ask spreads) and realized volatility (speciﬁcally
bipower variations from Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard, 2003). We consider both ﬁxed
transition probabilities Markov switching vector autoregressive models (FTP-MSVAR) and
time-varying transition probabilities Markov switching vector autoregressive models (TVTP-
MSVAR) as in Krolzig, 1997; Filardo and Gordon, 1998 or Kim et al., 2008. TVTP-VAR models,
in particular, allow for an explicit control of variables governing the regimes identiﬁed in the
models. In our case, the transition probabilities are governed by both the cycle in monetary
policy operations, and the cycle of French Treasury auctions of 10-year notes and three-month
bills.
The main results are as follows. First, the stepping-up of special reﬁnancing operations
withhighbid-to-coverratiosmakemoreprobabletheappearanceofanunconventionalregime
5in which liquidity, volatility and market segmentation between bonds occur. This is in line
with the potential excessive use of some types of collateral on account of funding tensions.
Second, regime identiﬁcation shows the potential asymmetry in the monetary policy stance
between conventional and unconventional regimes, whereby the same decision (for example
more frequent OMOs and loose liquidity provision) may have positive or negative effects de-
pending on the regime markets are in. As a consequence, a regime in which non-neutrality
of the monetary policy stance vis-à-vis the market for collateral is observed leads to higher
associated risks in the funding process.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we review the concepts of
market liquidity and central bank liquidity focusing on the linkages between collateral rules
and market dynamics. We present the recent developments on the French sovereign bond
market, including monetary policy during the 2007-2008 crisis and the funding tensions. In
the third section, we deﬁne indicators of liquidity and volatility and present the framework of
the models. The fourth section discusses the empirical results and focuses on their monetary
policy implications. Section 5 concludes.
2. LIQUIDITY
Liquidity is an elusive ﬁnancial market concept, often used to illustrate tensions observed
in the global ﬁnancial system in 2007-2008. However, this word encompasses several ﬁnancial
andmoregenerallyeconomicconcepts. AsunderlinedbyNikolaou(2009), wecandistinguish
three types of liquidity. The ﬁrst is the central bank liquidity provided through open market
operations. The second is the funding liquidity deﬁned by the BIS (2008) as the ability of
banks to meet their liabilities, and unwind or settle their positions as they come due. Finally,
the third type of liquidity concerns market liquidity, deﬁned by the IMF (2004) as the ability
of investors to trade quickly, at a fair price and low cost, a large amount of shares with a small
impact on prices. In 2007-2008, we observed in the ﬁnancial system:
6￿ a shortage of funding liquidity;
￿ a shortage of market liquidity in the funding market;
￿ central bank liquidity acting as a substitute for the market;
￿ a shortage of market liquidity on some other markets.
These diverse liquidity concepts are very close to each other but the potential channels
between them are not so well understood. Here we investigate the potential channel between
these three liquidity concepts constituted by the rules on collateral.
2.1. Collateral provision and liquidity
The central bank provides liquidity to banks through several channels. The majority of
these operations are main reﬁnancing operations (MROs) with a weekly frequency. The cen-
tral bank also uses long-term reﬁnancing operations (LTROs), the more recent very long-term
reﬁnancing operations (VLTROs) and some other one-off ﬁne-tuning operations (FTOs). A de-
tailed description of this primary channel of central liquidity is discussed in Idier and Nardelli
(2010) with a focus on the March 2004 reform of liquidity management.
A second channel for providing liquidity is the use of standing facilities. Any bank may
ask the central bank for reﬁnancing at any time at a penalty rate. This penalty is such that few
banks generally use these standing facilities. There is a "standing facility stigma" since banks
are usually reluctant to use them: it is usually a signal of weakness to the market for the bank
using the lending facility (even if it is theoretically conﬁdential). However, the recent crisis
has shown a clear increase in the deposit facility linked to an increase in risk aversion, and a
reduction of the penalty associated with it.
All these operations managed by the central bank lead to some collateral immobilization,
which we focus on here. To protect the ECB (and more generally any central bank) from
losses due to open market operations, collateral is used to back the operations. In the event of
7credit failure, this collateral may be liquidated by the central bank to get its money back. The
assets used as collateral must meet certain criteria to be eligible for the ECB in its reﬁnancing
operations (see ECB "The implementation of monetary policy in the euro area", November
2008).Theserulesweremodiﬁedinearly2007withtheintroductionofthesinglelistofeligible
assets. Notably, the ECB considers collateral eligibility for marketable and non-marketable
assets.
Concerning marketable assets, euro-denominated debt instruments with high credit rat-
ings traded on regulated markets3 are eligible, provided that the issuer is an EU member or
a G10 member. Non-marketable assets (credit claims and retail mortgage-backed debt instru-
ments) must be issued by credit institutions located in the euro area, with high credit ratings
and be denominated in euro. However, in the ECB’s monetary policy framework, the collat-
eral policy is generally restricted to marketable assets for outright transactions.4
To ensure the quality of collateral the ECB uses two additional measures: the haircut and
variation margins. An important aspect is that the value of the asset is marked to market
so that the ECB is exposed to downward variations in the collateral’s value during the loan
period. As a consequence, counterparties (banks) must provide additional cash to maintain
thevalueoftheasset(margin-calls). Obviously, thesevariationmarginsaresymmetricalandif
the value of the asset rises above a certain level, the counterparty retrieves the corresponding
cash.
The haircut is a percentage discount applied to the value of the collateral. The value of
the collateral is thus calculated as the market value of the asset less the haircut applied to this
category of assets.
TheECBhasintegratedthismarketdependencyintoitsrulessothatthelevelofthehaircut
is based on a liquidity criterion: the lower the liquidity, the higher the haircut. However, this
criterion is quite rigid and may not completely hedge the ECB against market inefﬁciencies.
3There are some exceptions in published lists of non-regulated markets accepted by the ECB.
4Some of these criteria have been relaxed during the crisis episode but for a limited period of time.
8There are ﬁve categories of liquidity for the assets used as collateral. The ﬁrst category is
considered to be the most liquid, with liquidity decreasing progressively across the four other
categories. Table 1 sums up these categories as regards marketable assets.





























Table 1: Liquidity categories for marketable assets (source: ECB)
Ineachofthesecategories, dependingontheresidualmaturityandthecoupon, thehaircut
varies from 0.5% to 20%. The best choice of collateral for participating to OMOs are thus
the government debts instruments. They usually meet high credit standards, enjoy market
liquidity and are traded on organized markets.
In addition, government bonds are also used as collateral in bilateral transactions on the
interbank market to cover funding liquidity needs. Given the ﬁnancial instability seen on
the market during the last few months, the secured segment (on the short maturity) of the
interbank market has served as a substitute for the unsecured segment due to the funding
9liquidity tensions. However, turnover in this market segment has slowed (a fall of 16% in
comparison with 2004-2005 levels), due to the decline in the quality of the collateral usually
used in bilateral repo transactions and the uncertainty related to counterparty risk. There is
therefore also a clear incentive to ask for high quality collateral on the secured market.
2.2. The implications of the crisis for liquidity
We investigate the funding liquidity pressure impact on the liquidity and volatility of as-
sets used as collateral. The 2008 crisis seriously undermined the interbank market. The ECB
thus decided to provide huge amounts of liquidity to the banking system through regular and
special OMOs.
With respect to regular open market operations, the ECB ﬁrst increased the levels of al-
lotments to meet liquidity needs through MROs and LTROs. Due to the high demand for
liquidity, the ECB decided to use a ﬁxed-rate tender with full allotment in order to completely
satisfy bank liquidity needs. In a ﬁxed-rate tender, the ECB gives the level of the rate ap-
plied to the MRO and banks are asked to give the corresponding amount of liquidity they
are willing to obtain at this price. In this way, their needs are completely met given the level
of the rate. This is in contrast to variable rate tenders in which banks provide ten rates and
ten corresponding amounts of liquidity that they are willing to obtain with no guarantee of
the ﬁnal amount allotted. In this way, the ECB limits tensions on the interbank market, but
provides large amounts of liquidity to the banking system, and this requires higher amounts
of collateral. This has also been coupled with the stepping-up of special operations as shown
in Figure 1.
The proportion of operations other than MROs and LTROs has dramatically increased
during the recent period5 from 3 to 40%. Moreover, from 2000 to July 2007 the mean amount
per operation of allotted liquidity in special operations was around EUR 17 billion, versus
around 40 billion between August 2007 and October 2008. Moreover, until July 2009, we note

























Source: ECB, authors’ calculations
FIG. 1 Proportion of ECB liquidity operations by type
no return to normal of the liquidity-providing operation calendar.
On the collateral side, the ECB took several measures to ensure the soundness of open
market operations in late 2008 (Directives ECB/2008/15 and ECB/2008/18). In particular, it
extended eligibility (with higher haircuts) to some other asset classes (asset backed securities,
syndicated loans for a given period, Japanese, US and UK credit claims, for example).
All these tensions in the banking system, resulted in the interbank market in a reluctance
for banks to lend to each other. However, when bilateral transactions occur, it seems that high
quality collateral is required and French government bond securities belong to this category.
This is illustrated in the OIS spread (see Figure 2), closely followed by market participants
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Source: Datastream
FIG. 2 Euribor-OIS Euribor spread between 2005 and July 2009
European market as a whole, high volatility on bond yields for short and long-term maturities
has been observed since August 2007. Moreover, bid-ask spreads also started to widen (see
ECB Monthly Bulletin, October 2008).
Due to governments’ ﬁscal commitments aimed at tackling the crisis and a general rise
in credit risk premia, risk aversion on bonds over the long term has increased. This is now
reﬂected in the yields for long-term securities. However, this has not occurred for all gov-
ernment bonds within the euro area. On the one hand, bonds are suffering from a ﬂight to
quality phenomenon whereby investors shift trading to traditionally strong government debt
securities (typically German or French ones). On the other hand, there is also a ﬂight to liq-
uidity issues with investors wishing to invest in liquid markets. In a period where reﬁnancing
is difﬁcult on the interbank market, it is clear that banks are mitigating their risk by investing
in markets where funds may be withdrawn rapidly. As a consequence, the liquidity of some
12bond markets has dried up (for example the Greek market) and trading has shifted to other
bonds markets. This combination of ﬂight to quality and ﬂight to liquidity may have marked
consequences for market efﬁciency.
3. AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE COLLATERAL CHANNEL
3.1. Dataset and market indicators
Our dataset consists in high-frequency (on-the-run) quotes for French debt securities with
3-month and 10-year maturities from Reuters Data Tick History ranging from January 1st,
2003 to July 31st, 2009. We have around 3.5 millions quotes for the bonds in question. Some
public holidays were removed from the sample due to the lack of trading (Christmas, New
Year Eve, Easter, France’s national holiday, etc.). Due to the greater dispersion of 3-month
contracts, with more frequent adjudications, the number of quotes is lower than for the 10Y
notes, for on-the-run contracts.
3.1.1. Liquidity indicators
The bid-ask spread reﬂects many factors (see Roll, 1984; Glosten, 1987; Glosten and Harris,
1988, 1991; Huang and Stoll, 1997; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001). One main component is
the transaction cost on the buy side and on the sell side. The larger the spread, the higher
the transaction cost (for bond markets, see Harris and Piwowar, 2006). Assuming that the
true value of the asset is in between the bid and ask prices, the larger the spread, the higher
the potential gap between this true value and the price investors have to pay for buying or
selling it. Fleming (2003) assesses in particular that spreads are good measures for tracking
liquidity on Treasuries. This measure is used in many markets and allows for comparisons as
in Chordia et al. (2003). Under usual market conditions, the price is deﬁned as the difference
between the ask price and the bid price. We construct an average daily bid-ask spread for
each rate. Since we are looking at the bid-ask spread for rates, which are inversely related to













Due to the partial information available on our dataset (e.g. no details about transaction
volumes), we restrict our analysis to this standard indicator as suggested by Fleming (2003).
3.1.2. Volatility measures
SincetheseminalpaperofMerton(1980), realizedvolatilityhasbeenwidelyusedinthelit-
erature. Typically, it uses the intraday returns of an asset to calculate daily volatility measures
by approximation of the quadratic variation. There are several realized volatility estimators
(see Avouyi-Dovi and Idier, 2010), but here the bipower variations are calculated following
the work of Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2003). First, let us consider a partition Ψ of the
day retaining the last transaction of equal subintervals of time (one hour in our case study).




where ri and ri￿ are subsequent returns for the considered subintervals of day t. The rationale
for this choice comes from its ability to remove the jump component. These jumps may be
quite usual during the day for liquidity reasons typically. This is not the case for the standard
realized volatility estimator of Merton (1980) deﬁned as the daily sum of squared returns (see
Andersen et al., 2006; Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard, 2002; Barndorff-Nielsen et al., 2006;
Huang and Tauchen, 2005; Tauchen and Zhou, 2004). The bipower variations are applied to
6We also deﬁned the daily spread as the median of spreads over a given day. This does not affect the results.
14bond yields and computed on 15-minute-frequency returns.
3.1.3. Monetary policy and funding tension indicators
To investigate monetary policy, we construct several indicators representing the ECB’s op-
erational framework and tensions during the reﬁnancing process. First of all, we consider a
set of dummy variables for OMOs, and their type: MROs, LTROs or Other. We also use the
allotted amount of OMOs and the bid-to-cover ratios of these operations. This bid-to-cover
ratio is the supply-demand ratio for liquidity. It summarizes some of the tensions related to
reﬁnancing between banks. All these indicators give the intensity with which market par-
ticipants are seeking reﬁnancing from the central bank and how the collateral market, as a
consequence, may be impacted by these operations.
3.2. Bond market and funding liquidity tensions
The amount of the negotiable debt for the French government almost doubled between
1998 and 2008, reaching EUR 988 billion at the end of September 2008. This upward trend
was made possible by the introduction of marketable products grouped into three categories
based on their initial maturities. The ﬁrst category comprises the short-term bond class with
maturities less than one year. In this category, three-month maturity bonds are typically is-
sued weekly and respond to short-term ﬁnancing needs. The second category includes bonds
with two or ﬁve-year maturities with a new adjudication per month. The last category con-
cerns long-term bonds with maturity from seven to 50 years with one adjudication per month.
After these regular pre-scheduled auctions, securities are actively traded on the secondary
market, where transactions are not centralized. This secondary market is an over the counter
market (OTC) and bilateral transaction details are partially known.
One main development in this market is its internationalization. An increasing share of
the negotiable French debt is held by foreign investors : by the end of 1998, it represented
1518.8% of negotiable debt compared with 62% by mid-2008. This internationalization could be
a vector of increasing liquidity on the market with a wider pool of market participants.
Figure 3 shows the daily changes in bond rates. While the short-term rate is anchored to
changes in the minimum bid rate of the ECB, 10-year rates are more independent of the rise
in interest rates that occured from the end of 2005. As a consequence, the bond spread shrank
until spring 2008. From September 2008, the ﬁnancial crisis and the ECB’s decision to cut
interest rates clearly increased this bond rate spread, with a huge drop in short-term maturity
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Source: Thomson Reuters Tick History, authors’ calculations
FIG. 3 Daily rate for French bonds between 2003 and 2009
With respect to liquidity, Figure 4 presents the bid-ask spread for the two bonds between
2003 and July 2009. The short-term maturity bond is less liquid than the longer-term one over
the sample. The average bid-ask spread for three-month maturity rates is about 3.7 bp, while
16it falls by 0.8 bp for the 10-year one.7
Broadly on the sample, the bid-ask spread for short-term maturity fell except during the
crisis of 2008 where it jumped twice in September and October. Moreover, volatility also
surged during this period.8 We note that the impact is stronger for the three-month maturity
than for 10-year bonds. Indeed, volatility for long-term bonds rose but did not soar.
There are several things to investigate in this area. First, liquidity and volatility may not
have the same interactions depending on the market segment. In particular, the monetary
policy framework may impact these indicators, as we mentioned earlier, so that some mar-
kets may be more vulnerable than others, even if they belong to the same liquidity class of
collateral as deﬁned by the ECB.
Looking at the monetary policy stance of the ECB, the duration (maturity) of OMOs have
increased over the last two years (except at the end of the sample with the proliferation of
special short-term maturity operations). These longer average durations result in longer im-
mobilization of collateral and thus less liquidity on the market for collateral. These longer
durations are coupled with the stepping-up of operations as underlined in the previous sec-
tion and the increase of allotted amounts. This clearly responds to greater liquidity needs and
is conﬁrmed by the bid-to-cover ratio. In 2007, it appears that the demand for liquidity was
on average 82% higher than the amount supplied and even reached 94% in 2008.
We wonder how the market for collateral is impacted by such developments in monetary
policy operations, i.e. stronger competition for liquidity and an increase in allotted collateral-
ized amounts.
7This is also conﬁrmed by the relative bid-ask spreads.
8For graphic convenience in Figure 4, three huge peaks in October 2008 (with a level of around 2800) have been
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Source: ECB, authors’ calculations
FIG. 5 Bid-to-cover ratio for ECB OMOs
3.3. A model accounting for monetary policy cycles and bond market dynamics
3.3.1. A ﬁxed transition probability model
We ﬁrst consider a general Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) stationary process including
variables such as: the daily variation in bond yields; log realized volatility calculated on the
basis of the work of Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2003); bid-ask spread variations. We
complete this set of variables with a monetary policy operation announcement indicator (as
deﬁned in Appendix 1).





ΦpXt￿p + γOMOt + µ + εt, (3)
where Xt is the vector of variables of interest as yield variations (∆r3,t, ∆r120,t), volatilities (σ3,t
, σ120,t) and liquidities (S120,t , S3,t), and OMOt a dummy variable having the value of 1 on
19OMOs announcement days and zero otherwise.
However, at daily frequency, it is hard to consider a homogeneous linear model for mar-
ket dynamics. Market dynamics are not usually linear, or even piece linear, but usually gov-
erned by several coexisting regimes. In line with Hamilton’s (1994) ﬁndings, we use a Markov
switching VAR to capture the dynamics of the variable of interest.9 To limit the number of pa-
rameters to be estimated and to circumvent identiﬁcation and estimation problems, since a
VAR model is estimated for each regime, we limit our analysis to two states (S = 2). So, con-
ditional on fXtgt=1:N, the history of past variables, we consider a two state model for st = 1,2
similar to Krolzig (1997) such that





t + µ(st), (4)
and
Xt ￿ E(Xt j st) = ut,
with ut follows a Gaussian distribution with zero mean. Since the volatility of the rates is
not constant over the sample (as presented in Figure 5), we also consider heteroskedasticity in
this MSVAR through the Σ(st) state dependent variance-covariance matrix ut. By considering
the state dependent variance, we obtain a mixture of two Gaussian distributions making it
possible to replicate the skewed and leptokurtotic distribution of bond yield variations (see
Idier et al., 2008).
The state process is generated by a homogeneous Markov chain with two states so that the
transition probabilities are deﬁned by:





9The model is a stationary VAR since no cointegration relationship was validated by the usual tests.










However, the FTP-model only identiﬁes regimes without explicitly considering the in-
formation or factors leading to such regimes. For example, the transition matrix may dis-
play jumps during speciﬁc days because some variables lead to greater persistence of some
regimes. It thus seems more relevant to identify factors which can drive changes of the tran-
sition probabilities.
3.3.2. A time-varying transition probability model
As a consequence, we also propose a time-varying transition probability model (as in Fi-
lardoandGordon, 1998)toexplicitlyconsiderboththemonetarypolicycycleandgovernment
debt issuing cycles. In order to ensure some good convergence properties, the complexity of
this model calls for a more parsimonious model than the previous one. We thus consider the




















































































+ η(st) + ut, (6)
21with st = 1,2 and with εt and ut follow a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and state
dependent variance-covariance matrices Σε(st) and Σu(st) respectively. Even if we have to
separate models, we consider the direct linkages between rate variations by introducing ∆r3,t
in eq. 5 and ∆r120,t in eq. 6.
To identify the regimes detected in the model, we consider an endogenous transition prob-
ability matrix, taking into account both the monetary policy cycle and the French government
bond auction cycle. The choice of these variables results from several constraints. First, the
frequency of the model and the daily market dynamics approach restrict the potential for in-
cluding real macroeconomic variables. Second, monetary and bond cycles, for institutional
reasons, are very interesting in terms of market structure since they are highly inﬂuenced by
their auction processes. Finally, given the issue of the impact of monetary policy on some
alternative markets, the liquidity of the funding process on the one hand and of the bond
market on the other need to be controlled for these substantial institutional features.
We thus consider both dummy variables and the bid-to-cover ratios resulting from the
corresponding adjudications to disentangle two possible effects:
1. We assume that the frequency of open market operations responds to a disequilibrium
in cash demand from banks and smooths funding liquidity tensions. In the same vein,
the scheduled debt market cycle is assumed to provide liquidity to the corresponding
bond market segment.
2. However, if the higher frequency of OMOs is associated with higher bid-to-cover ratios,
these operations may have an impact on markets, especially on the market for collateral,
thus revealing tensions in the funding process. For the same reasons, high bid-to-cover
ratios for debt auctions may reveal excess demand for this class of assets.












pm,ii(t) = Φ(δi + αi.OMO(t ￿ 1) + βi.AFTm(t ￿ 1) +
λi.OMO_cover(t ￿ 1) + γi.AFT_coverm(t ￿ 1))
with Φ beeing the cumulative normal density function, as used in Kim et al. (2008).10
In this framework, an interesting output are the regime dependent impulse response func-
tions (IRF). Here, we follow the methodology used by Ehrmann, Ellisson and Valla (2003)
with the additional feature that we consider generalized impulse response functions as in Pe-
saran and Shin (1998) since we do not make any assumptions about the order of the variables.
All variables used in the model are stationary, the tests being reported in Appendix 2. The





ln(f(xt j xt￿1,xt￿2,...x1)). (8)
The set of parameters Ω comprises the mean equation parameters and the parameters
used for time varying transition probabilities. The Gaussian density f(xt j xt￿1,xt￿2,...x1)
considers the different states of the Markov switching process as




f(xt j st = ¯ s)Pr(st = ¯ s j xt￿1,xt￿2,...x1)
with f(xt j st = ¯ s) the density conditional on the state and Pr(st = ¯ s j xt￿1,xt￿2,...x1) the state
10The results presented below are robust to some other transition probability forms (for example, a logit function),
which guarantee a well-deﬁned likelihood function.
23probabilities, elements of the (1,S) vector Πt updated for each date as
Πt =
f(xt) ￿ Πt￿1Tm(t)
[f(xt) ￿ Πt￿1Tm(t)]ι0 (9)
with * the Hadamard product, ι a (1￿ S) vector of ones, T the transition matrix deﬁned in
equation 7 and f(xt) the vector (1,S) with elements f(xt j st = ¯ s). For the robustness checks
below, we apply likelihood based tests to compare the different models to one another.
3.3.3. Model robustness and estimates
The models are estimated between the 1st of January 2003 and the 30th of July 2009. Es-
timation results are provided in Appendices 3, 4 and 5. In Appendix 3, the ﬁxed transition
probability model is presented and TVTP-VAR estimates are presented in Appendices 4 and
5. Several alternative speciﬁcations are tested. In particular we present here the different steps
concerning the restricted datasets X1
t =(∆r3,t, σ3,t , S3,t, ∆r120,t) and X2
t =(∆r120,t, σ120,t,S120,t,
∆r3,t). The ﬁrst step was to estimate a simple stationary VAR model. The next step was to
consider Markov switching VAR models for these sets of variables, and ﬁnally consider the
TVTP-VAR models as presented in equations 5 and 6.
On the basis of the estimated likelihoods, we consider Vuong’s (1989) model selection
tests. Let us consider two competing models with densities f and f0 given a respective set of
parameters Ω and Ω
0


























ˆ σT is the heteroskedastic and autocorrelated adjusted variance of the test deﬁned as































similar to a Newey West (1987) correction. The results are reported in Table 2 below.
set of variables X1
t X2
t








Table 2: Vuong (1989) selection model test results, (*) means rejection of the null: "models are equivalent"
The test indicates that introducing Markov switching models always improves the ﬁt of
the models. For the TVTP models, it improves the ﬁt for 10 year rates, while the FTP and
TVTP models for the 3 month rates are only equivalent.
In addition, we also apply the RCM statistics from Ang and Bekeart (2002) to check if the
two regimes in the TVTP-VAR models are clearly identiﬁed compared to a FTP-VAR. This








so that it is bounded between 0 and 100 and indicates that the lower the statistics, the better
25identiﬁcation for the regimes we have.
set of variables X1
t X2
t
RCM for FTP-VAR 2.42 5.69
RCM for TVTP-VAR 2.25 3.74
Table 3: Ang and Bakeart (2002) RCM statistics for regime identiﬁcation
The introduction of time varying transition proababilities improved the identiﬁcation of
the regimes, since we have smaller statistics in this case. Given the robustness of the TVTP-
models, our comments in the following section are based on the TVTP-MSVAR models.
4. THE ASYMMETRIC IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY
The two regimes are statistically identiﬁed and the ex-post regime probabilities are pre-
sented below. The debt market cycle and monetary policy cycles help to identify two regimes,
with a non standard one (regime one) which prevailed in 2007 and 2008. The unconditional
transition probability in the 10-year rate model and the 3-month model are rather low in the
ﬁrst regime, conﬁrming the non standard quality of regime 1.
4.1. Market inefﬁciencies, volatility and liquidity premia in the two regimes
The impulse response functions are obtained from the estimates of the two TVTP-MSVAR
models (see Appendix 6).
In the standard regime (regime 2), rate comovements are signiﬁcant and positive, both
from long to short-term rates and conversely. This illustrates French sovereign bond market
dynamics as whole. An initial development that appears to reveal a non standard regime on
the bond market is the increasing segmentation of the bond market.
A second element is that volatility premia in the standard regime become liquidity premia,
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FIG. 6 Regime 1 (top) and regime 2 (bottom) probabilities
27interest in the determination of corporate and sovereign bond market dynamics (Amihud
and Mendelson, 1991; Chakravarty and Saskar, 1999; Elton and Green, 1998 or Fleming and
Remolona, 1999). Indeed, investors prefer to act in markets where liquidity is abundant if they
are able to ﬁnd a counterparty to trade the liquidation of their portfolios without incurring
losses. On the treasury market, Longstaff (2002) shows some ﬂight to liquidity phenomena in
bond markets that potentially affect yield levels. Kamara (1994) and Goldstein et al. (2005)
notably make the link between market transparency, liquidity and price on bond markets.
Many studies have investigated the volatility and liquidity premia that interest rates may
account for, such as Diaz et al. (2006) for the Spanish treasury market and Longstaff (2002) for
US markets.
Figures 9 and 10 for 10-year rates show that in the standard regime there is a persistent
volatility premium. This can be compared to some extent with a GARCH in mean effect with
an increase in the rate stemming from a rise in volatility. This premium becomes almost in-
signiﬁcant in the unconventional regime with the rise of a strong and less persistent liquidity
premium for the 10 year rate. In the case of the three-month segment, premia in the standard
regimes are positive on prices (negative on rates). Liquidity is certainly less of a concern for
investors in the three-month market, since they are closer to the liquidation of their contracts
and have the option of rolling or liquidating them at a shorter horizon than for the 10-year
rate.
A last noteworthy fact is the spiral between market liquidity and volatility in the two
regimes (see Figures 11 and 12). Market illiquidity leads to stronger volatility for the 10 year
rate and conversely, higher volatility leads to lower market liquidity. These market dynamics
are reinforced in non standard regimes. This may strengthen the links mentioned in the early
part of this paper. At some point in time, due to the large impact of monetary policy and
tensions in the funding process, the monetary policy stance may not guarantee neutrality with
respect to markets, especially the market for collateral. Via this channel, there is a regime in
which funding tensions lead to market liquidity tensions when the frequency of OMOs is
28high. Therefore, due to the use of this asset class as collateral, it increases the risk of some
adjustments for banks exposed to collateralized credit with margin calls, since the operation
itself has an impact on the market used to determine the value of the collateral. This risk is
thus incompatible with the conventional monetary stance based on market neutrality.
To clarify the links between the monetary policy stance and possible market dynamics,
below we discuss the impact of the monetary policy cycle in regime identiﬁcation.
4.2. The role of the monetary policy cycle in regime identiﬁcation
If regime 1 concerns the 2007/2008 period of turmoil, it also encompasses early 2005 and
2006, when special OMOs on the interbank market were conducted by the ECB,11 and mone-
tary cycles reversed in response to increases in policy interest rates.
The impact of both the frequency of OMOs and the tensions resulting from these oper-
ations may be considered in different ways. On the one hand, the frequency of OMOs is sup-
posed to respond to the funding needs of the banking system so that their frequency smooths
possible disruptions to the ﬁnancial system. On the other hand, if these operations are com-
bined with a high bid-to-cover ratio, two effects may be expected: (i) a high bid-to-cover ratio
may reveal the lack of funding liquidity and the fact that the ECB is not responding sufﬁ-
ciently to liquidity needs; (ii) however, it may also reveal the need for the central bank to limit
its role in funding markets and to only meet efﬁcient demand (’efﬁcient’ would mean what
is calculated as benchmark supply by the central bank), so as not to replace the interbank
market.
Looking at the impact of monetary and bond cycles in these regimes (see Appendices 4
and 5), the impact of OMOs is two-fold.
In regime 2, which is the standard one, the impact of the frequency of OMOs and the bid-
to-cover ratio of these operations are insigniﬁcant for the 10-year rate, thus preserving the
market neutrality of monetary policy implementation. However, this is not true for the three-
11This followed implementation of the new operational framework in March 2004.
29month rate, the less liquid asset: the more frequent the OMOs, the higher the probability of
switching from the standard to the non standard regime. Moreover, when the bid-to-cover
ratio is low during these more frequent OMOs (i.e. the ECB largely satisﬁes all bids posted
by banks during the auction), the persistence of the standard regime is lower. This tends to
bear out the hypothesis mentioned in the early part of the paper: by stepping up OMOs and
ensuring higher allotment, the central bank may be encouraging the switch from a standard
regime to a non standard one by affecting the market used as collateral and triggering market
inefﬁciencies.
However, our ﬁndings concerning the impact of monetary policy on bond market dy-
namics, in the non-standard regime, indicate some asymmetric results. When this regime
occurs, more frequent OMOs associated with low bid-to-cover ratios (i.e. a loose liquidity
policy) appear to limit the persistence of this crisis regime.
This result is crucial since it introduces an asymmetry in the conduct of monetary policy:
on the one hand, policy makers should limit OMOs and supply limited liquidity to prevent
a switch from the standard to the non standard regime. On the other hand, if a crisis occurs,
by stepping up OMOs and minimizing the bid-to-cover ratio of these operations, they reduce
the persistence of the crisis regime.
To summarize, regime identiﬁcation highlights the difﬁculty of managing monetary policy
since identical measures may have "good" or "bad" effects depending on the regime markets
are in. To limit the switch from a standard to a crisis regime, OMOs should not be stepped up
and the supply of liquidity should be limited. However, to limit the persistence of the crisis
regime, OMOs should be stepped up and satisfy demand for funding.
The role of the bond market cycle Bond market cycles in the endogenous transition
probability are also considered from the point of view of the frequency of bond auctions, and
the tensions associated with these operations. The effects are less ambiguous for this cycle,
than for the monetary policy cycle since the timetable of auctions is very rigid and does not
30displayanyirregularityasthemonetarypolicycycleofOMOsmaydo, bothintheirfrequency
and in the auction process used.
The frequency of auctions has a homogeneous impact in the standard and in non standard
regimes. When an auction is held, the persistence of the crisis regime decreases and the per-
sistence of the standard regime increases for both rates. Lower bid-to-cover ratios for these
operations have the positive effect of limiting the probability of a switch from the standard to
the non standard regime, for both rates, and of shortening the crisis regime in the case of the
three-month rate.
The importance of this regime identiﬁcation process thus derives from the potential asym-
metric effects of monetary policy conduct. Having reached this point, the reader may now
consider the ﬁrst regime as the ’unconventional’ regime, and regime two as the’conventional
one’, with the less desirable fact that during the ’unconventional’ regime, the neutrality of the
monetary policy stance is not guaranteed.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper considers the impact of collateral provision and funding liquidity tensions on
the market for French government debt securities. In particular, we focus on three-month and
10-year rates in terms of price, volatility and liquidity linked to monetary policy cycles. This
is made possible by the analysis of all quotation data of on-the-run bonds between 2003 and
2009 in order to compute the bipower variations of the rate dynamics and the market liquidity
of the two debt securities via the analysis of bid-ask spreads. The interactions between these
different indicators are captured via the estimation of a time-varying Markov switching VAR
model and interpreted via the impulse response functions and the speciﬁcation of transition
probabilities.
The TVTP-VAR detects two regimes in the data: an unconventional regime and a conven-
tional one. The unconventional regime is characterized by the non neutrality of monetary pol-
31icy conduct with respect to the market for collateral (in our analysis the French bond market).
This regime is characterized by higher liquidity-volatility feedback and market segmentation
between the three-month rate and the 10-year rate. Moreover, the persistence of this uncon-
ventional regime may be reduced by stepping up OMOs and ensuring low bid-to-cover ratio
(i.e. a loose liquidity policy). This policy recommendation is however asymmetric since the
same monetary policy stance, i.e. more OMOs and loose liquidity, in the conventional regime
increases the probability of switching from the conventional to the unconventional regime.
In particular, the fact that the monetary policy stance is based on the market neutrality
hypothesis poses a new risk in the funding process when the unconventional regime occurs.
There is, in this regime, the potential for monetary policy to impact on some markets whose
assets are used as collateral. Therefore, banks are exposed to higher risk with collateralized
credits if margin calls are required or haircuts increased.
This highlights the difﬁculty for central banks in implementing an optimal liquidity pol-
icy due to these asymmetries in expected effects. The detection of which regime is prevailing
in order to determine the appropriate monetary policy is challenging. It is even more chal-
lenging now in 2010, since the question remains as to whether the prevailing regime is a
conventional or unconventional one. A return to market neutrality may therefore constitute
an exit strategy for monetary policy.
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366. APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Open market announcements, timing and deﬁnition.
The ECB and the national central banks announce publicly the open market operation
one day before the deadline for bid submissions of eligible couterparties (banks). This public
announcement is then followed by 5 subsequent steps:
1. tender announcement: (a) announcement by the ECB through public wire services and
(b) announcement by the national central banks through national wire services and di-
rectly to individual counterparties (if deemed necessary);
2. counterparties’ preparation and submission of bids;
3. compilation of bids by the Eurosystem;
4. tender allotment and announcement of tender results: (a) ECB allotment decision and
(b) announcement of the allotment result;
5. certiﬁcation of individual allotment results;
6. settlement of the transactions.
In particular, the ECB announcement delivers publicly the following information: the ref-
erence number of the operation, the date of the operation, the type of operation, the maturity
of the operation, the type of auction, the allotment method, the intended operation volume,
the ﬁxed rate (only for ﬁxed rate tenders), the min/max interest rate, the currency of the op-
eration, the exchange rate (in case of foreign exchange swaps), the maximum bid limit, the
minimum individual allotment (if any), the minimum allotment ratio, the time schedule of
the submission.
37Appendix 2: Stationary tests
Augmented Dickey Fuller test and Kwaitowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992) tests are
performed and reported with intercept.








Table 2.a: ADF and KPSS tests statistics
(￿) Validates the stationary hypothesis at the 5% level
38Appendix 3: MSVAR with ﬁxed transition probabilities.
∆r120,t, ∆r3,t, ∆S120,t and ∆S3,t are expressed in basis points and σ120,t, σ3,t are annualized
values of volatility. The number of lags is chosen via the Akaike and Schwarz criteria.














































































































































































R2 0.074 0.74 0.34 0.37 0.43 0.15
Table 3.a: Results for regime 1
(￿) Indicates signiﬁcance at 10% (￿￿) Indicates signiﬁcance at 5%
Student statistics are provided below the estimated coefﬁcients











































































































































































R2 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.35 0.22 0.18
Table 3.b: Results for regime 2
(￿) Indicates signiﬁcance at 10%
(￿￿) Indicates signiﬁcance at 5%
Student statistics are provided below the estimated coefﬁcients
40Appendix 4: MSVAR with time varying transition probabilities for 10-year rates.
























Table 4.a: Results for endogeneous transition probabilities (10Y)
(￿) Indicates signiﬁcance at 10%
(￿￿) Indicates signiﬁcance at 5%
Student statistics are provided below the estimated coefﬁcients













































































R2 0.08 0.54 0.25 0.42
Table 4.b: Results for "standard" regime
(￿) Indicates signiﬁcance at 10%
(￿￿) Indicates signiﬁcance at 5%
Student statistics are provided below the estimated coefﬁcients













































































R2 0.14 0.14 0.37 0.35
Table 4.c: Results for "non standard" regime
(￿) Indicates signiﬁcance at 10%
(￿￿) Indicates signiﬁcance at 5%
Student statistics are provided below the estimated coefﬁcients
43Appendix 5: MSVAR with variable transition probabilities for 3 month rates.

























Table 5.a: Results for endogeneous transition probabilities (3M)
(￿) Indicates signiﬁcance at 10%
(￿￿) Indicates signiﬁcance at 5%
Student statistics are provided below the estimated coefﬁcients












































































R2 0.34 0.54 0.05 0.07
Table 5.b: Results for "standard" regime
(￿) Indicates signiﬁcance at 10%
(￿￿) Indicates signiﬁcance at 5%
Student statistics are provided below the estimated coefﬁcients













































































R2 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.21
Table 5.c: Results for "non standard" regime
(￿) Indicates signiﬁcance at 10%
(￿￿) Indicates signiﬁcance at 5%
Student statistics are provided below the estimated coefﬁcients
46Appendix 6: Within regime Impulse response functions






































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
FIG. 7 IRFs for the mentioned variables
Note: Regime 1 IRFs are in black and the Regime 2 IRFs in grey
It corresponds to one std error positive shock
The 5 percent conﬁdence intervals (bootstrap) are shown
Note that for the 3 month model the scale is on the RHS in regime 2




















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
FIG. 8 IRF for the mentioned variables
Note: Regime 1 IRFs are in black and the Regime 2 IRFs in grey
It corresponds to one std error positive shock
The 5 percent conﬁdence intervals (bootstrap) are shown
Note that for the 3 month model the scale is on the RHS in regime 2


















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
FIG. 9 IRF for the mentioned variables
Note: Regime 1 IRFs are in black and the Regime 2 IRFs in grey
It corresponds to one std error positive shock
The 5 percent conﬁdence intervals (bootstrap) are shown
Note that for the 3 month model the scale is on the RHS in regime 2





































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
FIG. 10 IRF for the mentioned variables
Note: Regime 1 IRFs are in black and the Regime 2 IRFs in grey
It corresponds to one std error positive shock
The 5 percent conﬁdence intervals (bootstrap) are shown
Note that for the 3 month model the scale is on the RHS in regime 2










































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
FIG. 11 IRF for the mentioned variables
Note: Regime 1 IRFs are in black and the Regime 2 IRFs in grey
It corresponds to one std error positive shock
The 5 percent conﬁdence intervals (bootstrap) are shown
Note that for the 3 month model the scale is on the RHS in regime 2
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